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Russia’s War on Political and Religious 
Extremism: An Appraisal of the Law  
“On Counteracting Extremist Activity” 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On May 27, 2002, Tatyana Sapunova became a Russian national 
hero for taking a stand against anti-Semitism, a move that literally 
blew up in her face. When she removed a sign reading “Death to 
Yids,” a hidden bomb exploded, severely wounding her legs, hands, 
and face.1 Similar acts of terrorism soon followed.2  
In recent years, social tensions in Russia have ripened into 
alarming trends of violence, ranging from street attacks by groups of 
“skinheads,” to riots by soccer fans during Japan’s televised defeat of 
Russia in the 2002 World Cup, to the recent capture of seven 
hundred hostages by Chechen rebels at a Moscow theater.3 
In response to the escalating problem of ethnic and nationalist 
violence, the Russian Federation enacted the Federal Law On 
Counteracting Extremist Activity (“Extremism Law”).4 The 
Extremism Law codifies a definition of “extremism,” prohibits 
advocacy of extreme political positions, and imposes liability on 
organizations that do not disavow the “extremist” statements of 
their members. The law also allows government authorities to 
 
 1. Sabrina Tavernise, Bomb Attack Shows That Russia Hasn’t Rooted Out Anti-
Semitism, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2002, at A1, LEXIS, News & Business; see also Aleksandr 
Arkhangelsky & Yekaterina Grigoryeva, That Tatyana: Russia Doesn’t Have a Civil Society, But 
it Does Have True Citizens, IZVESTIIA, July 26, 2002, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-
SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 21, 2002, at 1. 
 2. See, e.g., Copycat Anti-Semitic Signs Ripped Down in Voronezh, MOSCOW TIMES, 
June 6, 2002, at 2; Nabi Abdullaev, Another Hate Sign Explodes, One Dead, MOSCOW TIMES, 
July 11, 2002, LEXIS, News & Business. 
 3. See, e.g., “Tsaritsyno Pogrom Won’t Be the Last”—So Says One Moscow Skinhead 
Leader, NOVIYE IZVESTIIA, Nov. 13, 2001, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET 
PRESS, Dec. 5, 2001, at 5; Oleg Stulov & Sergei Ponomaryov, Soccer Riot: Fans Trash All of 
Downtown Moscow, KOMMERSANT, June 10, 2002, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-
SOVIET PRESS, July 10, 2002, at 6; Natalia Yefimova et al., Armed Chechens Seize Moscow 
Theater, MOSCOW TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, LEXIS, News & Business. 
 4. On Counteracting Extremist Activity, Fed. Law No. 114–FZ (July 25, 2002), Sobr. 
Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 30, Item 3031, LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., RFLAW File (GARANT 
12027578) (English) [hereinafter Extremism Law]. 
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suspend, without court order, social and religious organizations and 
political parties; and creates incentives for local authorities to employ 
greater scrutiny in the registration and initiation of liquidation 
proceedings against organizations which the state deems undesirable. 
This Comment provides a comparison of the Extremism Law 
and its amendments to existing legislation. Part II reviews several 
recent trends motivating the passage of anti-extremism legislation. 
Part III provides an article-by-article overview of the law and a 
discussion of its unique provisions. Part IV.A discusses the adequacy 
of existing laws and prevalent tendencies of inadequate and arbitrary 
enforcement. Part IV.B discusses the likely impact of the Extremism 
Law on the freedoms of expression, association, and conscience.  It 
predicts a particularly harsh impact on nonprofit organizations, new 
religious movements, and religious organizations that have not 
traditionally maintained a presence in Russia. Part IV.C surveys the 
potential for perverse application of the law, drawing on actual 
scenarios that suggest the law may exacerbate the very tensions it 
seeks to quell. Part V provides a brief conclusion.  
II. FACTORS MOTIVATING ANTI-EXTREMISM LEGISLATION 
Fragmentation and integration of the Soviet Union into the 
world community has created new ethnic, political, and social 
tensions.5 The increasing prevalence of racism, nationalism, and 
concerns about dangerous religious “sects” and “cults” has 
contributed to a perceived need for additional legislation to combat 
these phenomena.  
It is no coincidence that the Extremism Law was adopted shortly 
after the widespread appearance of booby-trapped anti-Semitic 
signs.6 The increasing ranks of nationalist, fascist, and other 
intolerant groups that attribute Russia’s present economic and social 
 
 5. See generally Alexander Agadjanian, Revising Pandora’s Gifts: Religious and 
National Identity in the Post-Soviet Societal Fabric, 53 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 473 (2001); Tamara J. 
Resler, Dilemmas of Democratisation: Safeguarding Minorities in Russia, Ukraine and 
Lithuania, 49 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 89, 92–97, 103 (1997); Glenn Chafetz, The Struggle for a 
National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia, 111 POL. SCI. Q. 661, 674–79 (Winter 1996–1997). 
 6. See supra notes 1, 2. For accounts of anti-Semitic acts in Russia, see Polina 
Tomashevsky, Note, Russian Jewry: The History of Survival, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 165 
(2001) and William M. Cohen, The Escalation of Anti-Semitic Violence in Russia, Union of 
Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (Aug. 15, 1999), at http://www.fsumonitor. 
com/stories/081599cohenrp.shtml. 
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ills to ethnic and national minorities became a primary motivation 
behind anti-extremism legislation.7 Draft anti-extremism legislation 
gained additional momentum following the June 2002 soccer riots 
in Moscow that ended in massive disorder, vandalism of cars and 
Japanese restaurants, and racial violence, including assaults on five 
Japanese students.8 
Russia’s Muslims have also become targets of persecution 
following increased military efforts in Chechnya, the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, and the October 2002 
Moscow theater siege.9 There is a growing tendency, even within the 
Muslim community, to marginalize minority Muslim groups as 
extremists and terrorists.10 Although Russia has traditionally 
maintained good relations with Islam, the increased exposure of the 
predominately Muslim, former Soviet states of Central Asia to 
Middle-Eastern fundamentalist influences has created new concerns 
in Russian national security policy.11 These increased tensions 
represent one motivation for the Extremism Law. 
Legislators have also identified religious organizations as 
particularly prone to exhibit extremist characteristics.12 The 
antagonism of Russian legislators toward foreign religious 
organizations follows in part from Russia’s slow acceptance of 
concepts underlying Western religious pluralism.13 The appearance of 
financially-robust foreign religious groups during the liberalized 
period of the early 1990s contributed to embittered perceptions by 
 
 7. See Viktor Khamrayev, Response to Skinheads: Vladimir Putin Submits Bill on 
Combating Extremism, VREMYA NOVOSTEI, May 7, 2002, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. 
POST-SOVIET PRESS, June 5, 2002, at 9.  
 8. Stulov & Ponomaryov, supra note 3, at 6; see also Aleksandr Arkhangelsky et al., 
Defeat: Moscow Police Lose to Soccer Vandals, IZVESTIIA, June 11, 2002, at 1, reprinted in 
CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, July 10, 2002, at 6; Viktor Paukov, A New Kind of Riot: 
Law Enforcement Agencies Weren’t Prepared for It, VREMYA NOVOSTEI, June 11, 2002, at 1, 
reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, July 10, 2002, at 7. 
 9. Susan B. Glasser, Russia’s Muslims Become Targets; Fear, Insecurity Rise Since 
Theater Siege; “We Are the New Jews,” Imam Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2002, at A12, 2002 
WL 104308528. 
 10. Igor’ Rotar’, Under the Green Banner: Islamic Radicals in Russia and the Former 
Soviet Union, 30 RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 89, 95–96 (2002). 
 11. See generally Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, The Official Russian Concept of 
Contemporary Central Asian Islam: The Security Dimension, 49 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1501 (1997). 
 12. See Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 1. 
 13. LYNN R. ELIASON, PERESTROIKA OF THE RUSSIAN SOUL: RELIGIOUS RENAISSANCE 
IN THE SOVIET UNION 51 (1991) (noting tsarist and Soviet Russia were “untouched” by the 
Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment). 
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the financially-ailing Russian Orthodox Church and its followers that 
foreign groups were “purchasing souls” at the expense of Russian 
culture.14 Consequently, many perceive religious pluralism as a 
betrayal of “Russian-ness” and the Orthodox Church’s “spiritual 
rights to Russia.”15 
On a more general level, there are widespread perceptions that 
foreign religious organizations and new religious movements defraud 
the spiritually feeble, brainwash vulnerable youth, weaken family 
affections, discourage fulfillment of citizens’ responsibilities, and, in 
some cases, even use religion as a cover for espionage. Most of these 
perceptions are remnants of deeply engrained stereotypes that 
stigmatize unfamiliar religious traditions as “cults” and “sects.”16 
The understandable response of closely monitoring socially 
dangerous groups has unfortunately led to broad restrictions that 
tend to adversely affect many legitimate religious organizations that 
are not traditionally Russian. 
Nationalist populist movements, ethnic minorities, and 
nontraditional religious organizations all represent potential victims 
as well as alleged culprits of “extremism.” Although extremism is a 
blurry concept, many would agree with a definition forwarded by 
one Russian scholar: “Extremism, as it is well known, is characterized 
in the most general sense by adherence to extreme views and actions 
 
 14. Ralph Della Cava, Transnational Religions: The Roman Catholic Church in Brazil & 
the Orthodox Church in Russia, 62 SOC. RELIGION 535 (2001), 2001 WL 20525099 
(emphasizing the Orthodox Church’s financial inability to compete with foreign coffers). 
 15. Edwin Bacon, Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses, in 
RUSSIA AFTER COMMUNISM 113–14 (Rick Fawn & Stephen White eds., 2002); see also Harold 
J. Berman, Religious Rights in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Transition: A Historical Theory, 
in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 303 (Johan 
D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) (discussing Orthodox notions that Russia 
needs time to recover spiritually before foreign religions descend on it); ELIASON, supra note 
13, at 68 (noting perceptions of “conspiratorial potential” of foreign religions to “reap souls” 
at the expense of Russian culture). 
 16. See, e.g., Duma Appeal on Dangerous Religious Sects, Religion & Law Research 
Consortium, Dec. 15, 1996, at http://www.religlaw.org/template.php3?id=70. For a 
discussion on “cults” or “sects” in Russia, see Yana Afanasenko & Matvei Pismanik, ‘Tserkov’—
Sem’ya Detei Bozhiikh: An Indigenous Russian Neoreligious Phenomenon, 30 RELIGION, ST. & 
SOC’Y 277 (2002) and Oxana Antic, The Spread of Modern Cults in the USSR, in RELIGIOUS 
POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION 252–54 (Sabrina Petra Ramet ed., 1993). See generally Eileen 
Barker, Why the Cults? New Religious Movements and Freedom of Religion or Belief, in 
FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK (Tore Lindholm et al. eds., 
2001). 
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which radically diverge from social norms and rules.”17 More 
specifically, recent events have given rise to notions of “religious-
political extremism,” which entails “religiously motivated or 
religiously camouflaged activity, directed at the forceful alteration of 
the political system or the forceful seizure of power, violation of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, or incitement of 
religious animosity and hate with these goals in mind.”18 
Russia, of course, is not alone in its struggle against extremist 
groups.19 Nor is Russia alone in responding to terrorism by enacting 
legislation that has drawn criticism from proponents of freedom of 
association and expression. In discussing Russia’s Extremism Law, it 
is important to note that many criticisms contained in this analysis 
also apply to other countries. Russia’s anti-extremism law provides a 
timely reminder of the complexities of regulating speech, association, 
and religion, where restrictions can easily transform good intentions 
into a proverbial “two-edged sword.”20 
III. THE LAW “ON COUNTERACTING EXTREMIST ACTIVITY” 
The preamble to the Extremism Law declares the law’s purpose 
to be the “protection of the rights and freedoms of persons and 
citizens, the principles of the constitutional system, and the integrity 
and security of the Russian Federation.”21 To accomplish these goals, 
the Extremism Law codifies an official definition of “extremism,” 
 
 17. Abdyl Abdulvaganovich Nurullaev, Religiozno-politichicheskii ekstremizm: ponyatiye, 
sushchnost’, puti preoldoleniye [Religious-political extremism: understanding, essence, methods of 
negotiation], in DESYAT’ LYET PO PUTI SVOBODI SOVESTI [TEN YEARS ON THE PATH OF 
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE] 58 (2002). All translations in this Comment are the author’s 
unless otherwise noted. In the translations of laws provided by Garant or Lexis-Nexis, the 
author has taken the liberty of modifying the language where necessary to comport with 
standard English usage.  
 18. Id. at 59. 
 19. See generally JOHN GEORGE & LAIRD WILCOX, AMERICAN EXTREMISTS: MILITIAS, 
SUPREMACISTS, KLANSMEN, COMMUNISTS, & OTHERS 15 (1996) (“Extremism, broadly 
defined, existed in America virtually from the moment it was inhabited by humans.”); HANS-
GEORG BETZ, RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN WESTERN EUROPE 4 (1994) (“Recent 
electoral trends illustrate the dramatic rise, diffusion, and expansion of radical right-wing 
populist support in Western Europe.”); RAND C. LEWIS, A NAZI LEGACY: RIGHT-WING 
EXTREMISM IN POSTWAR GERMANY 6 (1991) (defining German right-wing extremism to 
include “those individuals who use[] illegal means of activity, such as criminal actions, and 
espouse[] the strong right-wing nationalist ideology”).    
 20. See infra Parts IV.A, C. 
 21. Extremism Law, supra note 4, pmbl. 
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extends several provisions of the Criminal Code to reach the 
preparatory stages of extremist activities and organizations whose 
members make extremist statements, and requires local and regional 
authorities to prevent and suppress the activities of extremist groups. 
A.  Article-by-Article Overview 
Articles 1 through 5 of the Extremism Law deal with the general 
framework of the law and its goals. Article 1 proposes a definition of 
extremism that focuses on four areas: (1) activities of social, 
religious, or other organizations; (2) promotion of Nazi, or Nazi-like 
paraphernalia; (3) public incitement to participation in extremist 
activities; and (4) financing the previously mentioned activities.22 
Article 2 affirms the principles of observance and protection of 
the rights of citizens and legal organizations, the law, openness, 
national security, prevention of extremist activity, cooperation with 
 
 22. Because the most significant contribution of the Extremism Law is the codified 
definition of extremism, upon which all other provisions of the law depend, the full text 
definition of “Extremist Activity” as defined by Article 1, is available here: 
  1. Activity of social and religious associations, or other organizations, whether 
through the mass media or by physical persons’ premeditated organization, 
preparation and execution of actions directed at: 
  •  forceful change of the fundamental constitutional structure and destruction 
of the integrity of the Russian Federation; 
  •  undermining the security of the Russian Federation; 
  •  seizure or appropriation of commanding authority; 
  •  creation of illegal armed forces; 
  •  carrying out terrorist activity; 
  •  incitement of social, racial, nationalistic or religious animosity; 
  •  debasement of national dignity; 
  •  creation of massive disorder, hooligan activities, and acts of vandalism 
motivated by ideological, political, racial, nationalistic or religious hatred or 
hostility, or otherwise motivated by hatred or hostility toward a social group; 
  •  propaganda of exclusivity, advocating either superiority or inferiority of 
citizens on the basis of religion, social, racial, national, religious or linguistic 
affiliation; 
  2. Propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi paraphernalia or symbolism, 
or paraphernalia or symbolism similar enough to be confused with Nazi 
paraphernalia or symbolism; 
  3. Public summons to, or commission of, the above-indicated activities; 
  4. Financing or encouraging the above-indicated actions, including providing 
the means for accomplishment of such activities through financial means, real estate, 
educational, polygraphic or material or technical resources, telephone, fax or other 
means of communication, informational services, or other types of material or 
technical resources. 
Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 1. 
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social and religious organizations and citizens, and punishment for 
commission of extremist acts.23 Based on these principles, Article 3 
states that counteraction of extremist activity will occur through 
adoption of preventive measures and disclosure, prevention, and 
suppression of extremist activity of public and religious 
associations.24 
Article 4 subjects federal and local bodies of the Russian 
Federation to the present law.25 Article 5 requires the bodies to take 
preventive measures, including educational and propagandistic 
measures, aimed at counteracting extremism.26 
Articles 6 through 8 deal with the issuance of official warning 
letters concerning the “inadmissibility of extremist activity” to 
organizations or persons found to be in violation of the law. Article 
6 authorizes the Procurator-General of the Russian Federation or his 
subordinate to issue a written warning to the head or leader of any 
organization based on confirmed information regarding an 
organization’s preparation to conduct “wrongful acts . . . containing 
signs of extremist activity,” even if such acts lack sufficient grounds 
for criminal liability.27 The letter will indicate the impermissibility of 
the activity and the grounds for issuance of the warning, as well as 
requirements for correcting the violations.28 The warning may be 
appealed in a court of law, but if the conditions and requirements 
contained in the warning letter are not fulfilled, the recipient of the 
letter may face administrative and/or criminal liability.29 
Article 7 establishes a two-month deadline for removal of the 
violations indicated in a warning letter.30 If an organization appeals 
the warning letter and a court finds the activities are legal, the 
organization may resume its activities. However, if the organization 
does not correct the violations indicated in the warning letter within 
the allotted time, or if during twelve months from the issuance of the 
warning “new facts [are] revealed testifying to signs of extremism in 
their activities,” the organization will be subject to liquidation and 
 
 23. Id. art. 2. 
 24. Id. art. 3. 
 25. Id. art. 4. 
 26. Id. art. 5. 
 27. Id. art. 6. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. art. 7. 
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its activities will be banned.31 Article 8 applies similar procedures to 
mass media, threatening termination for failure to correct violations 
noted in the warning letter.32 
Articles 9 and 10 deal with liability, liquidation, and suspension 
of social and religious organizations. Article 9 allows liquidation of 
social and religious organizations in cases involving “violations of the 
rights and freedoms of man and citizen, infliction of damage to the 
personality and health of individuals, the environment, public order, 
public security, property and economic interests of natural and 
juridical persons, society and the state, or that poses a real threat of 
inflicting such damage.”33 Groups without legal entity status may be 
banned by court decision.34 Article 10 allows the state to suspend the 
activities of a social or religious organization while liquidation 
proceedings on the decision to ban the organization are still 
pending.35 
Articles 11 through 13 deal with the dissemination of extremist 
materials through the mass media, public communication networks, 
and publication and other means of distribution. Article 11 allows 
the government to shut down a mass media outlet through court 
order in cases of extremist activity on the same grounds as indicated 
in Article 9, where the stated harm is caused through extremist 
activity utilizing the press, television, or radio broadcasting 
mediums.36 Additionally, Article 11 allows a court of law to suspend 
the sale or circulation of printed editions or radio or video recordings 
of these unauthorized uses of media, as well as to seize unsold 
publications or productions containing extremist material from 
inventories and wholesale and retail outlets.37 
Article 12 bans the use of public communication networks to 
conduct extremist activity.38 Article 13 prohibits the spread of 
printed, audio, video, or other materials containing any of the 
characteristics of extremism, including official materials of extremist 
organizations or material authored by persons previously convicted 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. art. 8. Similarly, this warning may be appealed in a court of law. Id.  
 33. Id. art. 9.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. art. 10. 
 36. Id. art. 11.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. art. 12. 
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in accordance with “international legal acts for crimes against peace 
and humanity.”39 An organization that publishes extremist materials 
twice within twelve months will be deprived of publishing rights.40 
Article 13 also establishes a federal list of extremist materials that 
may not be distributed in the Russian Federation and establishes 
administrative or criminal liability for persons who manufacture or 
store such materials.41 
Articles 14 and 15 establish liability for government officials and 
other natural persons. Article 14 imposes liability on a government 
official or employee for statements suggesting “the need for 
admissibility, possibility, or desirability of extremist activity made in 
public or in the discharge of their official duties, or with an 
indication of the post held.”42 This article also imposes liability for an 
official’s failure to adopt measures within his or her sphere of 
jurisdiction to suppress extremist activity.43 Article 15 imposes 
administrative and criminal liability on all persons who conduct 
extremist activity and requires public or religious organizations to 
publicly denounce extremist statements made by representatives of 
the organization within five days in order to avoid imputed 
respondeat superior liability. Article 15 also restricts people who have 
participated in extremist activities from participation in government 
or military service and from working in educational institutions or 
detective or security agencies.44 
Article 16 prohibits extremist activity during meetings, rallies, 
demonstrations, street processions, and pickets. Organizers of large 
events are responsible to see that extremist activity does not occur 
during those events and to suppress in a timely manner extremist 
activities that may arise.45 Article 17 applies all the foregoing 
provisions to public, religious, and other non-profit organizations of 
foreign states by banning any such organization whose activities are 
determined to be extremist. The ban entails cancellation of 
 
 39. Id. art. 13.  
 40. Id. para. 3. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. art. 14. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. art. 15. 
 45. Id. art. 16. 
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registration and prohibition on creating successor organizations in 
any form.46 
B.  Unique Provisions of the Extremism Law 
Although many of the provisions of the Extremism Law restate 
provisions of existing laws, consolidation of scattered legal provisions 
into a single law that addresses an increasingly prevalent need serves 
a valuable purpose and facilitates application and enforcement. In 
making this consolidation, these changes actually expand the scope 
of behavior characterized as extremist.  
Specifically, the Extremism Law codifies an official definition of 
extremism, expands liability for subversive activities and actions that 
incite racial tensions to include “planning, organizing, and 
preparing,”47 holds organizations accountable for extremist 
statements of their members, requires local and regional government 
officials to prevent extremism, empowers local and federal officials to 
suspend organizations without a court order, and amends the 
Criminal Code to prohibit organization of, and participation in, 
extremist organizations. 
1.  Codified definition of extremism  
The provisions included in this definition are unique only to the 
extent that Article 1 categorizes these activities within the formal 
definition of “extremism.”48 Although the practical effect of this 
formalization is unclear,49 a quick perusal of existing law reveals that 
these activities are already prohibited by the Constitution, the 
Criminal Code, and other laws governing applicable forms of non-
commercial association.50 In most cases, legislation accompanying the 
Extremism Law replaces the language of other laws—laws that 
previously dealt with behaviors now characterized as extremism—
with references to the Extremism Law.  For example, Article 16 of 
 
 46. Id. art. 17. 
 47. Id. art. 1.  
 48. See supra note 22 for the full text of the Extremism Law’s definition of 
“extremism.” 
 49. See infra Parts IV.A, C. 
 50. See infra note 81. 
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the law On Public Associations (“Association Law”),51 Article 14 of 
the law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations 
(“Religion Law”),52 Article 9 of the law On Political Parties,53 and 
Article 4 of the law On Mass Media54 all previously prohibited 
organization of public and religious organizations that advocate 
forceful alteration of the constitutional order of the Russian 
Federation, and many of the other of the actions included in Article 
1 of the Extremism Law. Although amendments to existing 
legislation enacted in connection with the Extremism Law appear to 
merely substitute the language describing extremist behavior with 
reference to the Extremism Law, thereby consolidating and 
streamlining Russian law, these changes actually do much more. 
For example, the Association Law forbids the creation of public 
associations whose “goals are aimed at a forcible violation of the 
foundations of the constitutional system and a violation of the 
 
 51. On Public Associations, Fed. Law No. 82–FZ (May 19, 1995), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 
1995, No. 21, Item 1930, LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., RFLAW File (GARANT 10064186) 
[hereinafter Association Law], amended by On the Introduction of Amendments and Addenda 
into Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection with Enactment of the Federal 
Law On Counteracting Extremist Activity, Fed. Law No. 112–FZ (July 25, 2002), Sobr. 
Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 30, Item 3029, LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., RFLAW File (GARANT 
12027576) [hereinafter Amendments and Addenda]. Part 4 of the Amendments and Addenda 
adds, “A public association may be liquidated and the activity of a public association, which is 
not a legal entity, may also be prohibited in the order and on the grounds, stipulated in the 
Federal Law On Counteracting Extremist Activity.” 
 52. On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, Fed. Law 125–FZ (Sept. 
26, 1997), Ross. Gazeta, Oct. 1, 1997, LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., RFLAW File (GARANT 
71640) [hereinafter Religion Law], amended by Amendments and Addenda, supra note 51, 
pt. 2, para. 1 (“The activity of a religious association may be suspended, a religious 
organization may be liquidated and the activity of a religious association, which is not a 
religious organization, may be prohibited in the order and on the grounds, envisaged in the 
Federal Law On Counteracting Extremist Activity.”). 
 53. On Political Parties, Fed. Law No. 95–FZ (July 11, 2001), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 
2001, No. 29, Item 2950, LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., RFLAW File (GARANT 83523) 
[hereinafter On Political Parties], amended by Amendments and Addenda, supra note 51, pt. 
15 (“A political party may also be liquidated in the order and on the grounds, envisaged in the 
Federal Law On Counteracting Extremist Activity.”). 
 54. On Mass Media, RF Law No. 2124–1 (Dec. 27, 1991), Ross. Gazeta, Feb. 8, 1992, 
LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., RFLAW File (GARANT 10064247) [hereinafter Media Law], 
amended by Amendments and Addenda, supra note 51, pt. 3 (“The activity of a mass medium 
may also be stopped in the order and on the grounds, stipulated in the Federal Law On 
Counteracting Extremist Activity.”). 
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integrity of the Russian Federation.”55 This provision focuses on the 
goals of the organization at the time of its creation. In addition to 
prohibiting these actions in the activity and goals of an organization, 
the Extremism Law additionally includes planning, organizing, and 
preparing to perform these acts in its definition of extremist 
activity.56 
Additionally, the prohibition of “propaganda of exclusion, 
advocating either supremacy or inferiority of citizens on the basis of 
religion, social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation” is a 
substantive expansion of grounds for liquidation or denial of 
registration.57 For example, Article 282 of the Criminal Code 
prohibits “[a]ctions aimed at the incitement of national, racial, or 
religious enmity, abasement of human dignity, and also propaganda 
of the exceptionality, superiority, or inferiority of individuals by 
reason of their attitude to religion, national, or racial affiliation.”58 
Article 282 only applies to public and religious associations if the 
prohibited actions are committed in public or with the use of mass 
media,59 whereas the Extremism Law does not limit its prohibition 
to these circumstances.60  
This expansion is problematic, especially with respect to religious 
organizations, because many religions distinguish themselves by 
claiming exclusive truth based on some superior doctrinal basis. A 
religious group may face extremism accusations based on private 
doctrinal discussions during regular worship services.61 
 
 55. Association Law, supra note 51, art. 16, amended by Amendments and Addenda, 
supra note 51, pt. 4; cf. Religion Law, supra note 52, art. 14; On Political Parties, supra note 
53, art. 9; Media Law, supra note 54, art. 4. 
 56. Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 1. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, No. 63–FZ (enacted June 13, 1996, 
effective Jan. 1, 1997), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1996, No. 25, Item 2954, LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., 
RFLAW File (GARANT 10008000) [hereinafter UK RF]. Article 282, serving as the code’s 
key provision on hate crimes, further increases the term of punishment from “two to four 
years” to “three to five years” when “committed: (1) with the use of violence or with the 
threat of its use, (2) by a person through his official position, [or] (3) by an organized group.” 
Id. art 282. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Compare Extremism Law art. 1, supra note 22, with supra notes 51–54 (establishing 
extremist activity as a ground for liquidation). 
 61. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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2. Expansion of inchoate liability  
The Extremism Law empowers the Procurator-General to issue a 
warning to an organization if he or she perceives characteristics of 
extremism in the organization’s activities, even “in the absence of 
grounds for criminal liability.”62 If the organization does not comply 
with the requirements of the warning, the Procurator-General may 
then file suit against the organization.63  
It is not clear whether “in the absence of grounds for criminal 
liability” refers to a missing element of corpus delecti or merely to 
inadequate evidentiary grounds for establishing probable cause. On 
the one hand, this provision deserves credit for providing a creative 
approach to a difficult problem. While people and organizations are 
potentially liable for extremism, a concept not easily defined, the law 
provides notice, opportunity to comply, and judicial review of the 
warning. 
On the other hand, this provision may be subject to abuse by 
low-level officials, who may use the warning letter to harass or coax 
organizations into compliance with their demands based on the 
threat of further proceedings. Additionally, there is some ambiguity 
in the translation: while the English version states that failure to 
comply with the warning letter may be grounds for holding the 
organization or individual criminally liable, the Russian version does 
not explicitly mention criminal liability in case of failure to comply 
with the warning.  
Lack of clarity on this provision may serve as a loophole for local 
prosecutors to threaten criminal proceedings against persons or 
organizations which have not technically committed criminal 
offenses. The possible use of intimidation tactics by regional 
authorities may be sufficient to control extremist tendencies but 
might also be used to burden legitimate organizations which do not 
have the means to challenge state actions in court. 
 
 62. Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 1. The warning must be in writing and 
indicate concrete grounds for the warning of inadmissibility of extremist activity and 
committed breaches. Id. art. 7. The organization has two months from issuance of the warning 
to correct the violations. Id. The warning to a social or religious organization may also be 
issued by federal executive justice bodies or regional justice agencies. Id. In all cases, the 
warning can be appealed in court. See id. art. 6, para. 3; id. art. 7, para. 3. Of course, the 
justice ministry will institute criminal proceedings without issuing a warning if the activities of 
the organization already rise to an established level of criminality. 
 63. Id. art. 6, para. 2. 
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3. Expansion of vicarious liability 
 The Extremism Law establishes several situations in which 
vicarious liability may be imposed on organizations for the extremist 
activities of other persons. Social or religious organizations may be 
held liable for extremist statements or activities of leaders or 
members of their governing bodies and subject to a finding that the 
organization is an extremist organization if the organization does not 
officially denounce the extremist statement or activity within five 
days.64 Similarly, organizers of large public events may be held liable 
for failing to ensure the event does not attract extremists, invoking 
the use of symbols or attributes or spread of extremist materials, or 
failing to timely suppress extremism.65  
 The provisions relating to statements made by leaders or 
representatives of an organization represent a beneficial approach to 
uprooting extremist tendencies in the accused organizations because 
the warning puts the organization on notice that the state has 
perceived extremist tendencies in the actions of its members or 
representatives and allows them opportunities to correct the alleged 
misconduct within five days. If the organization disagrees with the 
allegation it may choose to adopt the statement of its representative 
by default and then appeal the warning in court.66 Similarly, the 
potential liability of event organizers will put them on notice that 
they must take proper security precautions to prevent outbursts of 
violence or other dangerous situations. This will encourage 
organizations and organizers of public events to be more conscious 
of their affiliations and of the probable consequences of their 
activities. 
4. Fighting extremism on the local level 
 The Extremism Law requires local authorities to participate in 
the battle against extremism by requiring them to take preventive 
measures. Articles 4 and 5 call on all governmental organs of the 
Russian Federation to become involved in the prevention and 
suppression of extremism. Article 4 reads, “The federal bodies of 
state power, the bodies of state power of the subjects of the Russian 
 
 64. Id. art. 15. 
 65. Id. art. 16. 
 66. Id. art. 6. 
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Federation, and the local self-government bodies shall take part in 
the counteraction of the extremist activity within their 
jurisdiction.”67 Article 5 requires these same bodies to take 
preventive measures including “educational and propagandistic 
measures aimed at the prevention of extremist activity.”68  
 These provisions serve as a potent reminder for local authorities 
to be more vigilant in reviewing registration applications. 
Additionally, the law establishes liability for government officials for 
“non-adoption . . . within [their] sphere of jurisdiction of measures 
to suppress extremist activity.”69 The provision imposing liability on 
government officials for inaction has the potential to promote better 
efforts on the local level where laws are often unenforced.70 
However, in the absence of federal guidelines and accountability, this 
may produce disparate regional outcomes driven by local politics.71 
5. Suspension of organizational rights 
 While judicial proceedings for liquidation or determination that 
the organization is extremist are pending, the government organ that 
issued the warning and initiated liquidation proceedings may 
suspend the activities of the organization on the basis of a statement 
by the Procurator-General or his subordinate without a judicial 
order.72 Previously, only a court could issue a final decision 
restricting the rights conferred by legal entity status.73 Although 
suspension may be appealed in court, the presumption of valid 
suspension based on the prosecutor’s discretion represents a 
significant expansion of existing law. 
 Similarly, publication or distribution of extremist materials may 
result in suspension of an organization’s publishing rights. Extremist 
materials include specific references to works that are by the law’s 
 
 67. Id. art. 4. 
 68. Id. art. 5. 
 69. Id. art. 14. 
 70. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of arbitrary actions and refusals of local 
administrators to enforce the Extremism Law against groups with whom they may have 
beneficial affiliations.  
 71. See infra Part IV.C for hypothetical and actual examples of paradoxical outcomes 
arising from the broad discretion provided to local leaders under the Extremism Law.  
 72. Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 10, paras. 3, 4. 
 73. See Association Law, supra note 51, art. 44; Religion Law, supra note 52, art. 14; 
On Political Parties, supra note 53, art. 39. 
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definition extremist, such as materials from the National Socialist 
Workers’ Party of Germany or the Fascist Party of Italy, or other 
works which call for the commission of extremist activity, justify 
national or racial supremacy, or encourage the commission of crimes 
directed at social, ethnic, racial, or religious groups.74  
 Once a court declares that certain materials are extremist in 
nature, those materials will be included in a federal list that will be 
published periodically in the media.75 Organizations whose materials 
are included in the list of extremist materials twice during the course 
of twelve months will lose the right of conducting publishing 
activities.76 
6. Amendments to the Criminal Code  
The Extremism Law adds two new articles to the Criminal 
Code.77 Articles 282.1 (“Organizing an Extremist Community”) and 
282.2 (“Organizing the Activity of an Extremist Community”) make 
the creation of, or participation in, extremist organizations a 
criminally punishable offense.78 Article 1 of the Extremism Law 
defines an extremist organization as one for which a court has issued 
a decision on liquidation because of the organization’s involvement 
in extremist activity.79 Persons who are affiliated with an organization 
found to be extremist by a court of law may therefore be found 
criminally liable by mere association with the organization. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The definition of extremist activity attempted in Article 1 of the 
Extremism Law, although detailed and ostensibly well intentioned, 
remains somewhat vague and unpredictable in its foreseeable 
application. The Extremism Law significantly expands the police 
power of the state and creates opportunities for potentially 
mischievous application, especially on the local level where 
enforcement tends to be arbitrary and self-serving, a fact that 
suggests a strong potential for negative impact on legitimate 
 
 74. See Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 1; supra note 22 (full text of Article 1). 
 75. Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 13. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Amendments and Addenda, supra note 51, pt. 9. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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expression, association, and religious practice. Prior to discussing this 
impact, this section addresses the problem of selective enforcement. 
A.  Adequacy of Existing Laws and Inadequate Enforcement 
Critics of the Extremism Law note that the problem of proliferating 
acts of ethnic and nationalist violence lies in the lack of enforcement, 
rather than in the inadequacy of existing laws.80 The Criminal Code and 
other laws address the concerns and dangers outlined in the Extremism 
Law’s definition of extremism.81 The Criminal Code also imposes 
 
 80. See, e.g., Mikhail Vinogradov, State Duma Abolishes Skinheads: Deputies Pass Anti-
Extremist Law, IZVESTIIA, June 7, 2002, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET 
PRESS, July 3, 2002, at 1–2 (“[T]he law isn’t as necessary as it seems—its main provisions are 
already included in the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Granted, for some 
reason they aren’t being enforced.”); Extremism: Prophylaxis Best Defense, MOSCOW TIMES, 
June 6, 2002, at 8 (“[A] law on extremism is not required to fight [hate crimes]; existing laws 
are sufficient. The key is the political will to enforce them.”). 
 81. Compare each of the following elements from the Extremism Law’s definition of 
“extremism,” (set forth supra note 22) with provisions of existing legislation:  
•  “Forceful change of the fundamental constitutional structure.” Cf. KONST. RF art. 
13(5) (1993) (“The creation and activities of public associations whose aims and actions are 
aimed at a forced change of the fundamental principles of the constitutional system . . . shall be 
prohibited.”); UK RF, supra note 58, art. 278 (“Actions aimed at the . . . forcible change of 
the constitutional system of the Russian Federation, shall be punishable by deprivation of 
liberty for a term of 12 to 20 years.”); id. art. 279 (“Organization of an armed rebellion or 
active participation in it for the purpose of overthrowing or forcibly changing the 
constitutional system of the Russian Federation . . . shall be punishable by deprivation of 
liberty years.”). 
•  “Undermining the security of the Russian Federation.” Cf. KONST. RF art. 13(5) 
(1993) (“[U]ndermining [the] security [of the Russian Federation] . . . shall be prohibited.”); 
UK RF, supra note 58, art. 275 (“High Treason”); id. art. 276 (“Espionage”); Code of 
Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation, Fed. Law No. 195–FZ (Dec. 30, 2001) 
(amended Apr. 25, 2002), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 1, Part I, Item 1, art. 17.13, 
LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., RFLAW File (GARANT 12025267) [hereinafter KAP RF] 
(“Disclosing Information about Security Measures”). 
•  “Seizure or appropriation of commanding authority.” Cf. KONST. RF art. 3(4) 
(1993) (“[N]o one may usurp power in the Russian Federation. Seizure of power or usurping 
of state authority shall be prosecuted by federal law.”); UK RF, supra note 58, art. 278 
(“Forcible Seizure of Power or Forcible Retention of Power”). 
•  “Creation of illegal armed forces.” Cf. KONST. RF art. 13(5) (1993) (“[S]etting up 
armed units . . . shall be prohibited.”); UK RF, supra note 58, art. 205 (“Terrorism . . . 
committed: . . . with the use of firearms shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term 
of eight to fifteen years.”); id. art. 205.1 (“[A]rming or training of a person with the aim of 
perpetrating the said crimes . . . shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of 
four to eight years.”); id. art. 279 (“Organization of an armed rebellion or active participation 
in it for the purpose of overthrowing or forcibly changing the constitutional system of the 
Russian Federation, or of breaching the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, shall be 
punishable by deprivation of liberty years.”). 
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•  “Carrying out terrorist activity.” Cf. UK RF, supra note 58, art. 205 (“Terrorism”); 
On the Fight Against Terrorism, Fed. Law No. 130–FZ (July 25, 1998), Sobr. Zokonod. RF, 
1998, art. 3808, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/docs/law_980725.htm [hereinafter 
Terrorism Law]. 
•  “Incitement of social, racial, nationalistic or religious animosity.” Cf. KONST. RF art. 
13(5) (1993) (“The creation and activities of public associations . . . aimed at . . . instigating 
social, racial, national and religious strife shall be prohibited.”); UK RF, supra note 58, art. 
148 (“Obstruction of the Exercise of the Right of Liberty of Conscience and Religious 
Liberty”); id. art. 239 (“Organization of an Association Infringing upon the Liberties and 
Rights of Individuals”); id. art. 282 (“Incitement of National, Racial, or Religious Enmity”). 
•  “Debasement of national dignity.” Cf. KONST. RF art. 13(5) (1993) (“[V]iolating 
the integrity of the Russian Federation . . . shall be prohibited.”); id. art. 21(1) (“Human 
dignity shall be protected by the State. Nothing may serve as a basis for its derogation.”); UK 
RF, supra note 58, art. 110 (“Incitement to [s]uicide . . . [by means of] systematic denigration 
of the human dignity of the victim”); id. art. 130 (“Insult”); id. art. 282(1) (“Actions aimed 
at . . . abasement of human dignity”). 
•  “Creation of massive disorder, hooligan activities, and acts of vandalism motivated by 
ideological, political, racial, nationalistic or religious hatred or hostility, or otherwise motivated 
by hatred or hostility directly in relation to a social group.” Cf. UK RF, supra note 58, art. 149 
(“Obstruction of the Holding of a Meeting, Assembly, Demonstration, Procession, or 
Picketing, or of Participation in the Aforesaid”); id. art. 213 (“Hooliganism”); id. art. 214 
(“Vandalism”); KAP RF, supra, art. 20.1 (“Disorderly Conduct”); id. art. 20.2 (“Violating 
Established Procedure[s] for Arranging or Conducting a Meeting, Rally, Demonstration, 
Procession or Picket”). 
•  “Propaganda of exclusivity, advocating either superiority or inferiority of citizens on 
the basis of religion, social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation.” Cf. KONST. RF 
art. 29(2) (1993) (“The propaganda or agitation instigating social, racial, national or religious 
hatred and strife shall not be allowed. The propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or 
linguistic supremacy shall be banned.”); UK RF, supra note 58, art. 282 (“Incitement of 
National, Racial, or Religious Enmity”). 
•  “Propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi paraphernalia.” Cf. KAP RF, supra, 
art. 20.3 (“Displaying Fascist attributes and symbolism for the purpose of popularization of 
such attributes and symbolism shall entail the imposition of an administrative fine in the 
amount of from five to ten times the minimum amount of labour wages by confiscation of the 
Fascist attributes and symbols, or an administrative arrest for a term of up to fifteen days 
accompanied by confiscation of the Fascist attributes and symbols.”). 
•  “Public summons to, or commission of, the above-indicated activities” Cf. UK RF, 
supra note 58, art. 205.1 (“[P]ersuading a person to participate in a terrorist organization, the 
arming or training of a person with the aim of perpetrating the said crimes . . . shall be 
punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of four to eight years.”); id. art. 280 (“Public 
Appeals for a Forcible Change of the Constitutional System of the Russian Federation”). 
• “Financing or . . . providing the means for accomplishment of such activities.” Cf. UK 
RF, supra note 58, art. 205.1 (“[F]inancing of an act of terrorism or a terrorist organization 
shall be punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of four to eight years.”); On 
Countering the Legalization of Earnings Received in an Illegal Way (Money Laundering), Fed. 
Law No. 115–FZ, art. 6 (Aug. 7, 2001), Ross. Gazeta, Aug. 9, 2001, LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., 
RFLAW File (GARANT 12023862) [hereinafter On Money Laundering] (subjecting financial 
transactions involving large volumes to “compulsory control”). 
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aggravated liability for crimes committed by groups and organizations,82 
and higher sentences for crimes motivated by racial, ethnic, or religious 
hatred.83 
Notwithstanding existing laws that allow prosecution of the 
actions targeted by the Extremism Law, there are foreseeable 
benefits from the consolidation of scattered provisions into one law, 
such as ease of application and greater attention to grounds for 
regulating extremist behavior. It may also simply provide a greater 
psychological impulse to regulate more strictly social, political, and 
religious organizations. 
These benefits, however, may not overcome the problem of 
selective and seemingly arbitrary enforcement. Ironically, while the 
rise in neo-Nazi violence served as the most visible justification for 
the adoption of the Extremism Law, law enforcement appears to 
have partnered up with members of such nationalist movements in 
certain instances in order to fight other groups which are arguably 
extremists.  
One explanation for lax enforcement of existing laws in relation 
to ultra-nationalist groups appears to be that law-enforcement 
authorities benefit from their antics. When a skinhead assaulted a 
black U.S. Marine in 1999, it took international publicity of the case 
to prompt an investigation, an arrest, and legal action against the 
 
 82. See UK RF, supra note 58, art. 205(2) (“Terrorism . . . committed: . . . by a group 
of persons in a preliminary conspiracy . . . shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a 
term of eight to fifteen years.”); id. art. 205(3) (“Deeds stipulated in the first or second part of 
this Article, if they have been committed by an organized group, . . . shall be punishable by 
deprivation of liberty for a term of ten to twenty years.”); id. art. 282(2)(c) (raising the 
sentence from two to four years to three to five years for incitement of national, racial, or 
religious enmity when “committed: (a) with the use of violence or with the threat of its use; 
(b) by a person through his official position; [or] (c) by an organized group”). 
 83. See UK RF, supra note 58, art. 63(1)(f) (describing circumstances aggravating 
punishment, including “commission of a crime by reason of national, racial, or religious hatred 
or enmity”); id. art. 105(2)(k) (raising the standard sentence by five years for murder); id. art. 
111(2)(f) (raising the standard sentence by two years for intentional infliction of grave injury); 
id. art. 112(2)(f) (raising standard sentence by two years for intentional infliction of injury of 
average gravity to health); id. art. 117(2)(h) (raising standard sentence four years for torture); 
id. art. 244(2)(b) (raising the standard sentence from one month’s income or labor or three 
months imprisonment to restraint or deprivation of liberty for three years or imprisonment for 
three to six months for outrages upon bodies of the deceased and their burial places); id. art. 
357 (making genocide punishable by deprivation of liberty for twelve to twenty years, capital 
punishment, or deprivation of liberty for life). 
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skinhead.84 Less prominent victims have had greater difficulty in 
obtaining redress. This and similar instances have given rise to 
accusations of police sympathy toward the skinhead cause.85 
On the one hand, enforcement is precisely what the Extremism 
Law ensures by requiring action by local government officials,86 as 
well as potentially prohibiting, through court decision, persons who 
have engaged in extremist activity in the past from participating in 
government, municipal or military service, or employment in the 
police force or in private security companies.87  
On the other hand, the lack of enforcement guidelines and a 
strong potential that the law may be applied arbitrarily to serve 
political interests—a practice that is readily apparent in authorities’ 
dealings with social and religious groups and political parties—both 
suggest that authorities are using the law to restrict expression and 
burden undesirable organizations. Reports so far suggest that the 
Extremism Law has had little effect on the efforts of law enforcement 
officials, who have continued to dismiss racially motivated violence as 
“hooliganism” and who “deny that there is a racial component.”88 
Meanwhile, there is evidence that the Extremism Law is already 
 
 84. Acting under pressure from the United States, authorities found and arrested the 
skinhead responsible for assaulting the U.S. Marine. However, the pending trial further united 
Russia’s skinhead community, leading to skinhead protests outside the U.S. Embassy. The 
perpetrator, twenty-two-year-old Semyon Tokmakov, was eventually released. See Aleksandr 
Tarasov, Pogroms Have Already Begun: 30,000 Skinheads Are “Sanitizing” Our Cities, 
OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, Mar. 29–Apr. 4, 2001, at 15, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET 
PRESS, May 23, 2001, at 2. 
 85. Lidia Andusenko, Neo-Nazis Stage Pogrom in Honor of Hitler’s Birthday, 
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Apr. 24, 2001, at 1–2, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET 
PRESS, May 23, 2001, at 4 (“The skinheads sometimes call themselves ‘trash collectors’ and 
‘city sanitation workers,’ because another of their goals is to rid society of drug addicts, 
homosexuals, pedophiles and the destitute. . . . Needless to say, this ideological orientation . . . 
finds, if not overt support, then at least secret sympathy from many representatives of military, 
security and law-enforcement agencies.”). In an interview, one skinhead corroborated this 
claim: “Sometimes the cops treat us with understanding, maybe because they realize that in a 
certain sense we’re helping them.” Viktor Kostyukovsky, “Garden-Variety” Fascism, NOVIYE 
IZVESTIIA, Sept. 17, 2002, at 1, 5, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 16, 
2002, at 11. 
 86. See Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 14 (“[N]on-adoption by an official in 
accordance with his sphere of authority of measures to suppress extremist activity shall entail 
the responsibility set by the legislation of the Russian Federation.”). 
 87. See id. art. 15, para. 2. 
 88. See Putin’s Anti-Extremism Drive Is Failing, Rights Group Charges, 3 BIGOTRY 
MONITOR, Jan. 31, 2003, at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/013103Russia.shtml 
(reporting charges by the Moscow Helsinki Group). 
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being used to discriminate against religious believers and human 
rights organizations.89 
B.  Impact of the Extremism Law on Fundamental Freedoms 
The fact that legal grounds exist but are not enforced suggests 
other motivations for enacting anti-extremism legislation. Some 
critics have suggested that “the law is a ‘club’ to be wielded against 
political parties and nongovernmental organizations”90 and to be 
used by special services in taking revenge against “unfavorable” 
organizations.91 In light of potential abuses, this section considers 
the effect of the Extremism Law on the fundamental freedoms of 
expression, association, and conscience. 
1.  Freedom of expression 
The Extremism Law imposes restrictions that narrow the range 
of permissible expression. Russia’s international human rights 
obligations require some restrictions on expression that incites racial, 
national, or religious animosity. However, broad restrictions on 
expression, especially in a climate where the mass media is largely 
state-controlled, suggest a potential for repressive and mischievous 
application.  
The Russian Federation Constitution guarantees “freedom of 
ideas and speech” to everyone and prohibits forced expression or 
rejection of convictions.92 Article 13 prohibits the establishment of 
an official state ideology and affirms the commitment to protecting 
ideological diversity.93 The broad language of Article 29 protects 
freedom of the press: “Everyone shall have the right to freely look 
for, receive, transmit, produce, and distribute information by any 
legal way.”94 Similarly, the constitution guarantees the right to mass 
 
 89. Id. (referring to a human rights group in Krasnodar, and disparate treatment of 
individuals whose religious requirements conflict with public policy). 
 90. Vinogradov, supra note 80, at 1. 
 91. Antiekctremistckii zakon ogranichit deyatel’nost’ religioznikh organizatsii 
[Antiextremism legislation restricts the activity of religious organizations], MIR RELIGII, June 7, 
2002, at http://www.religio.ru/arch/07Jun2002/news/3862_print.html. 
 92. KONST. RF art. 29(1), (3) (1993). 
 93. Id. art. 13. 
 94. Id. art. 29(4). 
GRO-FIN 5/31/2003  1:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
738 
communication and prohibits censorship.95 These freedoms are also 
protected by international norms.96  
Although American arguments for free speech are worth noting, 
Russia tends to side with the European approach to restrictions on 
expression that affords greater protection to dignity and honor.97 
Even some American scholars recognize that “each society must 
decide for itself where to draw the line between freedom of 
expression and the demands of public order and security.”98 
Article 1 of the Extremism Law identifies several expression-
related components of extremism. These include incitement of 
social, racial, nationalistic, or religious animosity; debasement of 
national dignity; propaganda of exclusion; advocacy of supremacy or 
inferiority based on religious, social, racial, national, or linguistic 
affiliation; propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi or Nazi-
like paraphernalia; and public summons to other illegal activities, 
such as overthrow of the constitutional order or subversion against 
national security.99 
As a preliminary matter, the restrictions on hate speech provided 
in the Extremism Law may actually be required by international 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, art. 10(1), reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 140 (Tad Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
ECHR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 19, reprinted in 
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 57 (Tad Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 
1998) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 
1976, art. 19(2), reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 69 (Tad 
Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Russia ratified the ICCPR on 
October 16, 1973. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2003). 
 97. See Winfried Brugger, Ban on or Protection of Hate Speech? Some Observations Based 
on German and American Law, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 14–15 (2002) (noting historical 
reasons for differences between U.S. and European cultures of free expression); Laura R. 
Palmer, A Very Clear and Present Danger: Hate Speech, Media Reform, and Post-Conflict 
Democratization in Kosovo, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 179, 205 (2001) (noting that America was 
born of dissent and distrust of government institutions and generally arguing that the 
preference of American law for unfettered freedom of speech does not present a workable 
model for “post-conflict” and transitional societies). 
 98. Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the 
“Auschwitz”—and Other—“Lies,” 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 319 (1986) (discussing restrictions in 
German law prohibiting Holocaust denial). 
 99. See generally Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 1. 
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human rights norms.100 Article 20(2) of the ICCPR reads, “Any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited 
by law.”101 Exercise of the right to freedom of expression “carries 
with it special duties and responsibilities . . . [and] may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions . . . .”102 The corresponding general 
comment further explains that “these required prohibitions are fully 
compatible with the right of freedom of expression[,] . . . the 
exercise of which carries with it special duties and responsibilities.”103 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee concludes the 
comment by stating that in order for ICCPR Article 20 “to become 
fully effective there ought to be a law making it clear that 
propaganda and advocacy as described therein are contrary to public 
policy and providing for an appropriate sanction in case of 
violation.”104 However, because freedom of expression is crucial to a 
democratic society, attempts to suppress even the most insidious 
forms of expression should be scrutinized under the European 
Convention’s “necessary in a democratic society” test.105 Although 
Russia may derogate from its commitment to freedom of expression 
in times of public emergency in order “to ensure the safety of 
 
 100. See generally Michael O’Boyle, Right to Speak and Associate Under Strasbourg Case-
Law With Reference to Eastern and Central Europe, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 263 (1993); Peter 
Krug, Censorship as an International Obligation?, POST-SOVIET MEDIA L. & POL’Y NEWSL., 
Nov. 17, 1993, at http://www.vii.org/monroe/issue02/krug.htm; Elizabeth F. Defeis, 
Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response to Hate Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT’L L. 57 
(1992). 
 101. ICCPR, supra note 96, art. 20(2). 
 102. Id. art. 19(3) (limiting, however, the restrictions to “such as are provided by law 
and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputation of others; (b) For the protection 
of national security or of public order[,] . . . or of public health or morals”). 
 103. United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 11(19), July 29, 
1983, para. 2, reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 96 (Tad 
Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998) [hereinafter Gen. Cmt. No. 11].  
 104. Id. (urging that states “which have not yet done so should take the measures 
necessary to fulfill the obligations contained in Article 20”); cf. International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1965, art. 4(c), reprinted in 
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 112 (Tad Stahnke & J. Paul Martin 
eds., 1998) [hereinafter CERD] (“[States s]hall not permit public authorities or public 
institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.”). 
 105. See ECHR, supra note 96, art. 10(2) (noting that restrictions are “necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection 
of the reputation of rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”). 
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citizens and the protection of the constitutional system,”106 this is 
only permissible for limited durations in time of emergency. 
Several justifications exist for the regulation of expression, 
particularly racist or hate speech. Racist speech often serves as a 
precursor to direct violence or psychological injury against 
minorities.107 Hate speech may also result in indirect harms to 
minorities “by affecting the way others perceive minority groups, 
making it more likely that those exposed to racist propaganda will 
engage in acts of discrimination and even violence against 
minorities.”108 Some have re-characterized hate speech as a 
“mechanism of subordination” rather than a form of 
communication, therefore affording it a lower level of protection.109 
If the purpose of public discourse in democratic societies is to 
form public consensus, then this presupposes “community” and 
“civility rules” in order to function and flourish.110 Thus, restrictions 
on hate speech primarily aim to preserve “individual dignity” and a 
“civil tone” in society, rather than actually reducing the level of 
violence associated with such speech.111 This justification for speech 
restrictions demonstrates one important difference between the 
American and European approaches: the American approach tends to 
prohibit hate speech only where there is an imminent danger of 
illegal harm, whereas the European approach seeks to prevent hate 
speech much sooner in order to preserve individual and group 
 
 106. KONST. RF art. 56 (1993). Cf. ICCPR, supra note 96, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 96, 
art. 15. A declaration of a state of emergency is governed by the law On State of Emergency, 
Fed. Konst. Law No. 3–FKZ (May 30, 2001), Sobr. Zokonod. RF, 2001, No. 23, Item 2277, 
LEXIS, Int’l Law Libr., RFLAW File (GARANT 12023122) [hereinafter On State of 
Emergency]. A state of emergency is a “temporary measure applied exclusively to ensure the 
security of citizens and the protection of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation,” 
id. art. 1(2), is introduced by presidential decree, id. art. 4, and may not exceed sixty days, id. 
art. 9.  
 107. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 293–94 (1995). 
 108. JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON 
FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 128 (1999). 
 109. POST, supra note 107, at 310 (quoting Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist 
Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2358 (1989)). 
 110. Id. at 300; see also GEORGE & WILCOX, supra note 19, at 55 (distinguishing 
between extreme views, which promote democracy, discussion, and debate of problems, and 
the extremist approach, which “muddies the waters of discourse with invective, defamation, 
self-righteousness, fanaticism, and hatred, and impairs our ability to make intelligent, well-
informed choices”). 
 111. WEINSTEIN, supra note 108, at 138; see also Tomashevsky, supra note 6, at 181. 
GRO-FIN 5/31/2003  1:13 PM 
717] Desktop Publishing Example 
 741 
dignity and promote open civil discourse.112 Free speech that 
contributes to the public discourse presupposes at least a minimum 
level of mutual respect, which racist speech undermines by silencing 
minorities, making the very object of democracy unattainable. 
Although principles of dignity and civility seem to justify the 
Extremism Law’s restrictions on inflammatory hate speech, there 
may be reason for concern about potential politically-motivated 
misapplication or selective application to moderate groups or even to 
the very groups that the restrictions were designed to protect. This is 
especially problematic in Russia’s case for two reasons: First, the 
Extremism Law gives added incentive to local authorities to err on 
the side of cautiousness, a policy that would tend to declare marginal 
groups extremist because failure to take adequate measures to 
prevent extremism may entail liability of the responsible state official. 
Second, the Extremism Law forwards an overly broad definition of 
extremism.  
Both features suggest that the law may be misapplied and 
selectively enforced. Ultimately, an objective court of law will 
determine whether an organization is extremist. However, while that 
determination is pending, local registration officials have 
considerable discretion to restrict organizations through suspension 
of legal entity rights. Broad definitions of extremism, which regional 
officials are disposed to apply selectively, will likely lead to a chilling 
effect on legitimate democratic and political expression.  
Broad restrictions on expression also risk the possibility that the 
attitudes underlying denied expression will reemerge in more 
extreme forms as a result of “martyring extremists.”113 As a practical 
matter, the publicity surrounding prosecutions for hate speech may 
produce the same—or even more effective—result of inciting hate 
mongers to violence.114 Germany has faced this problem in its 
attempts to regulate Holocaust denials and Nazi paraphernalia, 
where neo-Nazi sentiment has moved into larger mainstream 
 
 112. See Brugger, supra note 97, at 21. 
 113. WEINSTEIN, supra note 108, at 152–53. 
 114. Id. at 150–53 (“[H]ate speech prosecutions run the very real risk of creating some 
of the dangers that hate speech laws are meant to prevent by giving publicity to racist 
organizations they could not purchase at any price.”). 
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audiences.115 Apparently this is already occurring in Russia to some 
extent, as the Russian Communist Party has attempted to form 
alliances with Russian National Unity, a neo-Nazi party.116 
Furthermore, speech restrictions in an atmosphere of state 
controlled mass media increases the ability of the state to exert 
pressure on marginal groups by influencing popular opinion. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has recently 
expressed concern about Russia’s media restrictions, noting “very 
serious concerns regarding Russia’s commitment to freedom of 
expression.”117 Generally, attempts to control information in post-
Soviet Russia have resulted in reassertion of authoritarian, rather 
than popular, control—a result that further stifles democratic 
development.118  
At the extremes, prohibitions against hate speech do not seem 
unreasonable. However, given the potential for broad interpretation 
of extremism, it is not clear who will benefit and who will suffer from 
the Extremism Law. The uncertainty surrounding the definition of a 
difficult concept like extremism paired with regional variation in 
extremism problems and increased incentives for government 
officials to crack down on extremism suggests that enforcement of 
the Extremism Law may result in disparate and paradoxical 
outcomes.119 
2.  Freedom of association 
The Extremism Law creates several potential threats to freedom 
of association for social and religious organizations, as well as for 
political parties. First, the Extremism Law permits the suspension of 
social and religious organizations for an indefinite period of time 
without judicial proceedings, pending determination by a court of 
 
 115. See David E. Weiss, Striking a Difficult Balance: Combatting the Threat of 
Neonazism in Germany While Preserving Individual Liberties, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
899, 902 (1994). 
 116. See Russian Communists Ready for Alliances Including Neo-Nazis, 3 BIGOTRY 
MONITOR, Feb. 28, 2003, at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/022803Russia.shtml; see 
also supra Part IV.A. 
 117. OSCE Media Watchdog Concerned Over Increased Pressure on Media in Russia, 
OSCE Press Release, Nov. 3, 2002, at http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id= 
2859&uid=2. 
 118. See Francis H. Foster, Information and the Problem of Democracy: The Russian 
Experience, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 290 (1996). 
 119. See infra Part IV.C. 
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law as to whether the organization is extremist. Second, as a practical 
matter, the Extremism Law creates incentives for local authorities to 
regulate more strictly the registration of such organizations, which 
will increase the instances of violation of freedom of association 
already being experienced by social and religious organizations. 
Because the law poses certain, unique challenges for religious 
organizations, those organizations will be treated separately in the 
next section.120 This section focuses primarily on nongovernmental 
organizations, public associations, and political parties. 
The Russian Federation Constitution guarantees freedom of 
association. This guarantee extends to all social spheres and includes 
the right to freely associate with public or social organizations, 
religious organizations, and political parties.121 A “public association” 
is a voluntary, self-governing, non-profit formation organized by 
individuals united by common interests through the legal entity 
structure of a public association.122 The right to association includes 
the right to establish associations for the protection of common 
interests, the achievement of common goals, and the realization of 
the rights and lawful interests of individuals.123 Public associations are 
equal before the law.124 Freedom of association is protected by 
international norms.125 
 
 120. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 121. See KONST. RF art. 30(1) (1993). 
 122. Association Law, supra note 51, art. 5. 
 123. Id. art. 3. 
 124. KONST. RF art. 13(4) (1993). 
 125. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 96, art. 20 (“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association. 2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.”); 
ECHR, supra note 96, art. 11(1) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions 
for the protection of his interests.”); ICCPR, supra note 96, art. 22(1) (“Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade 
unions for the protection of his interests.”).  
  The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly held that freedom of association 
entails the right to legal entity status as an integral part of the right to association. See Freedom & 
Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey, App. No. 23885/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int (holding that freedom of association may not be breached unless the 
association creates a threat to democracy); United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, App. 
No. 19392/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (holding that 
associational rights apply to political parties); Sidiropoulos v. Greece, App. No. 26695/95, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (1998), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (holding that legal entity status is an 
integral part of freedom of association). 
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The state does not require associations to register in order to 
enjoy associational rights. However, to acquire the additional rights 
afforded by legal entity status, such as the right to enter into 
transactions in the name of the association or to invite foreign 
persons to the Russian Federation, the Russian Civil Code requires 
social organizations to register with the local departments of 
justice.126 Although registration may be denied if the documents 
submitted for registration do not comply with the requirements of 
law, registering authorities cannot deny registration merely because 
the authorities consider the goals of the organization socially 
undesirable.127 The Association Law accords organizations the broad 
power to determine their internal structure, purposes, and 
activities.128 
As applied to public associations and religious groups, the 
Extremism Law potentially runs afoul of Article 6 of the European 
Convention, which guarantees “a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal” in the 
determination of an individual’s civil rights, obligations, or of any 
criminal charge.129 Article 10 of the Extremism Law empowers 
government organs of registration to suspend social and religious 
groups pending examination by a court of law of the alleged 
extremist statements or activities for which the Procurator-General 
seeks liquidation or a permanent ban.130 This suspension entails a 
complete cessation of activities, including organizing or holding 
meetings and maintaining bank deposit accounts.131 
 
 126. Grazhdanskii kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Civil code of the Russian Federation] art. 
51(1), in NOVIYE ZAKONI ROSSII [NEW LAWS OF RUSSIA] (Pravo i zhizn, 2002) [hereinafter 
GK RF]. 
 127. Id. art. 51(1), para. 2. 
 128. Association Law, supra note 51, art. 15. 
 129. ECHR, supra note 96, art. 6. For further discussion of the Russian Federation’s 
track record on due process, see Jeffrey Kahn, Russian Compliance with Articles Five and Six of 
the European Convention of Human Rights as a Barometer of Legal Reform and Human Rights 
in Russia, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 641, 689–90 (2002) (“Struggling with its Soviet legacy, 
the Russian Federation is only gradually accumulating new conceptions of the role of the state, 
rights of individuals, and the rule of law. . . . But the ECHR is a start, and a step, in the right 
direction.”). 
 130. Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 10, para. 2. 
 131. Id. art. 10, para. 3. The organization may appeal the suspension in court if the 
reviewing court ultimately finds in favor of the organization it may resume its activities. Id. art. 
10, paras. 3, 4. 
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Although the provision of a right to appeal the suspension is a 
mitigating feature of Article 10, it does not fully redeem the 
provision from tension with Article 6 of the European Convention, 
which requires that the impartial tribunal take place “within a 
reasonable time.”132 The absence of any limitation on the duration of 
the suspension exacerbates the potential lack of due process and 
creates the potential for undue delay in determination of 
organizational rights. The absence of such a limitation may easily 
become a strategic weapon of delay for prosecutors who may not be 
able to succeed in obtaining a decision for liquidation, but who may 
find it desirable to “wait out” undesirable organizations. 
Moreover, the Extremism Law provides additional psychological 
stimulus to regional and local authorities to deal more harshly with 
religious and social organizations, a feature which compounds the 
concerns over suspension noted above. Consider the incentives that 
the Extremism Law provides: the law specifically requires local and 
regional authorities to become involved in the battle against 
extremism,133 while at the same time establishing liability for local 
and regional authorities who do not take sufficient measures within 
their sphere of jurisdiction to prevent and suppress extremist activity. 
Although the law is vague on the nature of this liability, it is not 
difficult to see that in order to avoid potential penalties, local 
authorities will tend to overcompensate to avoid liability for not 
preventing extremism. This will likely lead to further tightening of 
registration procedures and a greater frequency of liquidation 
proceedings. 
Additionally, because of the effect the law will have on regional 
registration authorities in creating incentives to become more strict 
in registration procedures, it will tend to exacerbate the existing 
problem with the registration procedures for social and religious 
organizations. Specifically, legitimate organizations who comply with 
the procedures will be subject to delays, threats of judicial 
proceedings, and burdensome requests, while illegitimate 
organizations may attempt to circumvent the registration procedures 
and operate illegally. 
An illustrative series of cases resulted from the re-registration 
campaign following the enactment of the Association Law in 1995. 
 
 132. ECHR, supra note 96, art. 6. 
 133. Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 4. 
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The Association Law affirms the right of individuals to form public 
associations “on a voluntary basis for the protection of the common 
interests and the achievement of common goals.”134 The Association 
Law likewise ensures that registration cannot be denied on the mere 
judgment of the state registration body that creation of the 
organization is not expedient.135 At the time of its enactment, the 
Association Law also imposed a requirement that organizations 
previously registered must re-register. 
Although authorities cannot deny registration on the ground 
that an organization does not serve a valuable purpose, regional and 
local administrators have taken advantage of the re-registration 
requirement to eliminate “undesirable” organizations.136 According 
to a reported statement by one official, the requirement for 
nongovernmental organizations to re-register was “aimed at 
reducing the number of organizations with a strong political focus 
and aspirations to get on the ballot before the State Duma election, 
and at isolating radical and extremist political groups . . . for the sake 
of the public good.”137 Although this was the stated purpose of the 
Association Law’s re-registration requirement, the Association Law 
actually “affected those who, in reality, promote public interests, 
such as human rights, environmental and other organizations.”138 
The re-registration requirement presented a number of 
difficulties to organizations that were already registered. However, 
local and regional authorities have reportedly used several responses 
to further complicate this process. These responses include making 
unreasonable requests from parties seeking registration beyond the 
requirements imposed by the Association Law, failing to provide 
explanations of the grounds for denial of registration, failing to 
provide reasonable explanations or clarification on the proper form 
of documents required by the region, and failing to provide notice of 
deficiencies in the submission forms soon enough to allow for timely 
 
 134. Association Law, supra note 51, art. 3. 
 135. Id. art. 23. 
 136. See Report on the Violations Committed in the Course of Registration and Re-
registration of Public Associations in the Russian Federation in 1999, 2 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-
PROFIT L., (Feb. 15, 2000), at http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol2iss4/ar_yuri1.htm 
[hereinafter Report on Violations] (noting that human rights and environmental organizations 
have been the most vulnerable).  
 137. Id. (summarizing statement by Minister of Justice, Pavel Krasheninnikov). 
 138. Id. 
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correction and resubmission.139 The arbitrary variation of registration 
procedures and interpretations of registration laws has resulted in 
what one former insider admittedly calls “crushing . . . organizations 
one after another . . . .”140 
Russian authorities appear skeptical of the prospects of a 
privately-controlled, nonprofit sector acquiring functions previously 
administered by the state. One explanation for this may be the state’s 
fear of losing influence over economic and social development, even 
when the state is clearly incapable of performing necessary social 
functions. Another explanation may be fear of political 
competition.141 Incumbent politicians apparently recognized the 
political advantage of restricting the number of political parties that 
may compete for votes in upcoming elections.142 
Authorities explained the re-registration campaign of 1996–1999 
as an attempt to rid the landscape of radical and extremist groups for 
the public good; however, practical application of the law led to a 
much more expansive campaign imposing significant difficulties on 
legitimate, non-radical, non-extremist organizations as well. The 
Violations Report concludes that “[i]llegitimate, and sometimes 
insulting demands made by officials of justice departments to human 
 
 139. Id. Authorities often refuse to re-register organizations based on the organization’s 
support for unpopular regional political positions. Id. (noting several environmental 
organizations, including, among others, the Don Green Party, which was denied registration  
without explanation for opposing the opening of the Rostov Atomic Power Plants); see also 
Irina Dementyeva & Ilya Medovoi, The Authorities Are Getting Rid of Society’s Rough Edges, 
OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, May 2–15, 2002, at 15, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET 
PRESS, June 5, 2002, at 2. 
 140. Dementyeva & Medovoi, supra note 139, para. 4 (statement of Yury Kostanov, 
lawyer and former director of the Moscow Justice Administration) (“[W]hen I was 
director[,] . . . if [a nongovernmental organization’s] charter wasn’t quite up to the mark, I 
could say, ‘Revise it and we’ll register you.’ . . . Now registration has to be denied outright; no 
corrections are allowed. And if you haven’t been re-registered, you’ll be destroyed.”). 
 141. See Report on Violations, supra note 136. Governor of Ryazan, V.N. Lyubimov, 
argued against an extension of the re-registration deadline for the 1995 Association Law to 
allow more organizations to re-register because this would increase the number of political 
parties, of which, he considered, “there are far too many” already. Id. 
 142. Jeremy Bransten, Putin Seeking New Legislation to Combat Extremism, RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, May 10, 2002, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/05/10052002 
083148.asp (“[E]xperts express concern that Putin’s bill could be misused to shut down 
mainstream opposition parties.”). Political parties have already begun to feel the effects of the 
Extremism Law. See Pavel Aptekar, Berezovsky’s Party Denied Registration, VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 
July 15, 2002, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 14, 2002, at 7; 
Party in Russian Enclave Warned About Extremism, BBC MONITORING, Aug. 30, 2002, 2002 
WL 26566810. 
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rights groups and other [nongovernmental organizations] applying 
for re-registration, were so common that they suggest a conscious 
policy directed against nongovernmental organizations,” a policy 
that “threatens the development of civil society in Russia.”143 
Evaluating this result in light of the stated policy—elimination of 
radical and extremist groups—it appears that application of the 
Association Law was misguided, allowing problems of extremism to 
persist while denying non-extremist groups re-registration due to 
mere technicalities and arbitrary requirements. 
The experience of the Association Law and reported statements 
by officials indicate that eliminating extremism was not the sole aim 
of the Association Law’s re-registration requirement; as noted 
previously, elimination of political competition, retention of state 
authority, and other political motivations have lead to denials of 
registration.144 And if the same tendency of local and regional 
authorities to employ varying and arbitrary requirements in 
reviewing registration submissions continues, there is little guarantee 
that organizations will be shielded from similar difficulties under the 
Extremism Law. The practical effect of these alterations is an 
expansion of state power under the Association Law to liquidate and 
suspend public associations and nongovernmental organizations. 
 
 143. Report on Violations, supra note 136; see also Dementyeva & Medovoi, supra note 
139, at 3 (quoting Stanislav Markelov, lawyer) (Nongovernmental organizations are the 
“building blocks of a civil society [and] need . . . to be defended by all possible legal means. 
Otherwise, we’ll live to see the day when indictments read, ‘He is a member of such-and-such 
an organization, and therefore he has committed a crime.’”). 
 144. In fact, in some instances even the Office of the President of the Russian Federation 
has requested denial of certain registrations for political advantage. Valentin Kovalyov, former 
Minister of Justice (1995–1997) admits: 
When I was . . . minister of justice, the president’s staff used to send me 
unambiguous directives to deny registration to various nongovernmental 
organizations for the purpose of, for example, limiting the number of participants in 
the electoral process as elections to the State Duma or other governmental 
structures drew nearer. I also got similar “orders” from the director of the FSB, the 
minister of internal affairs, the secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council 
and, what was even worse for me as a minister, from the chairman of the 
government. Attempts to use legal procedures to achieve political goals were made 
back then, and they are still being made today. . . . I say this openly, especially since 
I never followed those instructions. 
Dementyeva & Medovi, supra note 139, at 3. 
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3.  Freedom of conscience 
The Extremism Law’s provisions on suspension and increased 
involvement of local authorities will affect religious organizations at 
least to the same extent as they will affect social organizations and 
political parties. Religious organizations are presently subject to a 
registration scheme very similar to that described in the previous 
section in connection with the Association Law. And religious 
organizations have encountered the same difficulties in obtaining 
registration. However, religious organizations, as explicit targets of 
the Extremism Law, deserve a separate discussion because religious 
association, which entails freedom of conscience, expression, and 
belief, receives a higher level of protection under international 
norms.145 
The Russian Federation Constitution guarantees freedom of 
religion, conscience, and belief. Article 13 ensures political and 
ideological diversity, while declaring that the state may not establish 
an obligatory ideology.146 Article 14 declares that Russia is a “secular 
state,” prohibits the establishment by the state of an obligatory state 
religion, and declares all religious associations equal before the law 
and separate from the state.147 Article 28 guarantees to every person 
“freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, including the right to 
profess individually or together with others any religion or to profess 
no religion at all, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious 
and other views and act according to them.”148 International norms 
also protect freedom of conscience and religion.149 The European 
 
 145. See Lance S. Lehnhof, Note, Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of Religious 
Organizations to Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention, 2002 BYU L. 
REV. 561, 581 (arguing that “religious associations are entitled to at least the same, and 
probably a higher, level of protection under Article 11 than other types of associations”). One 
factor supporting this conclusion is the language of the ICCPR, supra note 96, art. 18, which 
parallels language in ECHR, supra note 96, art. 9, protecting freedom of conscience. The 
ICCPR specifically states that the protections provided in Article 18 may not be subject to 
derogation, even in times of emergency, while still allowing derogation from protections of 
freedom of association and expression. See ICCPR, supra note 96, art. 4(2); cf. KONST. RF art. 
56(3) (1993) (“The rights envisioned in [Article 28 (freedom of conscience)] . . . shall not be 
liable to limitations.”). 
 146. KONST. RF art. 13 (1993). 
 147. Id. art. 14. 
 148. Id. art. 28. 
 149. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 96, art. 18; ECHR, supra note 96, art. 9; ICCPR, 
supra note 96, arts. 18, 27. 
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Court of Human Rights, in a well-developed series of cases, has 
continuously held that freedom of conscience entails more than the 
mere right to hold a personal belief, strongly suggesting that the 
right to legal entity status is included in the right to freedom of 
conscience.150 
First in 1990 and then again in 1997, the Russian government 
enacted legislation governing the practice of religious organizations. 
The 1990 law created a fairly liberal regime that promoted the 
growth of foreign religious organizations and, in some instances, led 
to a rise in religion-related abuses. A concern over the spiritual 
security of the country led to the enactment of the 1997 Religion 
Law, which provided a stricter registration regime intent on 
mitigating the activities of dangerous “sects” and “cults.”151 
The registration provisions of the 1997 Religion Law, which 
grant privileged status based on the religion’s duration of presence in 
Russia, are the most controversial parts of the law because they 
discriminate between “traditional” religions, new religious 
movements, and foreign religions.152 In spite of declaring all religions 
equal before the law, the registration provisions of the Religion Law 
undermine equal treatment. The annual re-registration procedure for 
organizations that have not reached a fifteen-year threshold of 
existence on Russian soil conflicts with the constitutional protection 
against retroactivity,153 with international norms,154 and with 
 
 150. Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, App. No. 25528/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997), 
http://www.echr.coe.int (legal entity status protected); Hasan & Chuash v. Bulgaria, App. 
No. 30985/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), http://www.echr.coe.int (right to association 
subsumed in discussion of freedom of conscience); Sidiropoulos v. Greece, App. No. 
26695/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998), http://www.echr.coe.int (legal entity status is an integral 
part of association). 
 151. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (2002), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf 
/2002/13958.htm [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT]. 
 152. W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Lauren B. Homer, Russia’s 1997 Law On Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical Appraisal, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 101, 
119 (1998); see also T. Jeremy Gunn, Caesar’s Sword: The 1997 Law of the Russian Federation 
on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43, 90 
(1998) (“[T]he rationales . . . are merely pretexts to discriminate against all religious activities 
that, in the eyes of the government, appear to be new to the Russian soil.”); Arina Lekhel, 
Note, Leveling the Playing Field for Religious “Liberty” in Russia: A Critical Analysis of the 
1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,” 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
167, 211 (1999). 
 153. KONST. RF art. 54(1) (1993). 
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decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court, which have generally 
upheld the requirement but have allowed a grandfather provision for 
organizations registered prior to 1997.155 Accounts of difficulty in 
acquiring legal entity status through registration are plentiful.156 Of 
course, without legal entity status many religious organizations are 
unable to fully function because they lack the legal ability to rent 
meetinghouses, purchase property, and hold bank accounts. As 
noted earlier, several features of the Extremism Law increase the 
likelihood that local authorities will use the law to discriminate 
against non-traditional religious groups by further complicating the 
registration process. 
Legislators who think the Religion Law’s restrictions do not go 
far enough in countering extremism and curbing the proliferation of 
nontraditional religions have proposed a series of draft laws that 
would strengthen the Religion Law’s grasp. In 2002, Alexander 
Chuyev, Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Public Associations 
 
 154. See United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 22(48), July 
20, 1993, para. 2, reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 92 (Tad 
Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998) (“Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional 
religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to 
those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to 
discriminate against any religion of belief for any reasons, including the fact that they are newly 
established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility by a 
predominant religious community.”). 
 155. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 151. 
 156. See id. Several particularly high profile cases illustrate the onerous nature of the 
Religion Law’s registration regime. Jehovah’s Witnesses have remained a constant target of 
what the Council of Europe’s Monitoring Committee has called “harassment against a 
religious minority” where criminal and legal proceedings against the group proceeded for up to 
six years. Id.; see also Charlotte Wallace, The Jehovah’s Witnesses Case: Testing the 1997 Law “On 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” and the Russian Legal Process, 32 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 39 (2001).  
The Salvation Army has faced accusations of paramilitary activity and endured seemingly 
pretextual reasons for being denied registration, such as inadequacy of submitted documents. 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 151. However, the Salvation Army enjoyed brief 
success in March 2002 when the Constitutional Court held that authorities improperly liqui-
dated the organization after its many failed attempts to register. Id.  
Other instances of discrimination include visa denials, see, e.g., Geraldine Fagan, Previ-
ously Unpublicised Case Brings Number of Expelled Catholics to Seven, KESTON NEWS SERV., 
Sept. 17, 2002, at http://www.keston.org/knsframe.htm, and favoritism in the courts, see 
Putin’s Anti-Extremism Drive, supra note 88 (contrasting two regional court decisions: in one, 
a court held that Orthodox believers were exempt on religious grounds from using mandatory 
tax identification numbers, while in the other, a court held that Muslim women were required 
to remove their headscarves for passport photographs because Interior Ministry policy trumped 
their religious beliefs). 
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and Religious Organizations, introduced a draft law—“On 
Traditional Religious Organizations”—which would raise the fifteen-
year requirement to eighty years to obtain the most privileged level 
of legal entity status.157 In early 2003, such proposals continued to 
circulate in the Duma.158 
At an initial level, the Extremism Law will affect religious 
organizations in much the same way as it will affect social 
organizations and political parties as discussed in the previous section 
(i.e., through a tightening of registration and liquidation procedures 
as well as the potential for arbitrary application and pretextual use to 
achieve political goals).159 Several religious groups have expressed 
concern about the Extremism Law’s vague definition of extremism 
and its potential for mischief.160  
 
 157. Sergey Yugov, A Barrier to Religious Extremism to be Created in Russia, 
PRAVDA.RU, Feb. 12, 2002, at http://english.pravda.ru/society/2002/02/12/26363.html 
(“[T]he necessity for creation of such a law . . . has been pressing for a long period already. . . . 
The state is to stimulate traditional religious associations (Orthodoxy, first of all) to resist the 
religious extremism and numerous preachers and missionaries who invade Russia from the 
West.”).  
 158. Frank Brown, Lawmakers Support “Values” of Nation’s “Traditional Religions,” 
RUSSIAN INTERCESSORY PRAYER NETWORK, Mar. 20, 2003 (on file with author). 
 159. For accounts of regional application of the Religion Law and supplementary local 
laws, see Lauren B. Homer & Lawrence A. Uzzell, Federal and Provincial Religious Freedom 
Laws in Russia: A Struggle For and Against Federalism and the Rule of Law, 12 EMORY INT’L 
L. REV. 247, 248 (1998) (noting that “repressive features [of the federal Religion Law] . . . 
ha[ve] led many regional administrations to conclude that they can act arbitrarily and with 
impunity in dealing with religious minorities”). 
 160. See, e.g., Geraldine Fagan & Tatyana Titova, Diverse Opposition to Measures 
Outlawing “Religious Extremism,” KESTON NEWS SERV., July 17, 2002, at 
http://www.keston.org/knsframe.htm (“From a legal point of view and taking into account 
the law’s possible application to religious organisations . . . [Lev Simkin, a Moscow lawyer who 
represents the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) in Russia,] considered 
the law to be ‘wholly dubious.’”); Pnina Levermore, Anti-Extremism Law in Russia Could 
Worsen Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes, JEWISH BULL., June 21, 2002, at 
http://www.jewishsf.com/bk020621/comm3.shtml (“On its face, this proposed law seems 
like a good idea. . . . However, without a clear and precise definition of what ‘extremism’ is, 
such legislation could in fact pose a threat to those who need its protection most.”); Fred 
Weir, Russian Bill Pits Free Speech Against National Security, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 
21, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0621/p09s01-woeu.htm (noting adequacy of 
existing law and tendency to silence valid criticism); Jonathan Gallagher, Leader Sounds 
Caution on Russia’s Draft Religion Laws, ADVENTIST NEWS NETWORK, April 16, 2002, at 
http://www.adventist.org/news/data/2002/03/1018968540/index.html.en (“We are 
opposed to the drafts on religious extremists [which pose] definite challenges to religious 
freedom . . . . You do not need to identify ‘religious’ extremists, but to deal with all extremists 
in the same way.”). 
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Moreover, there is an additional concern that implicates freedom 
of expression, association, and conscience. One definition of 
extremism in Article 1 includes “propaganda of exclusivity, 
advocating either supremacy or inferiority of citizens on the basis of 
religion, social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation.”161 
This definition is problematic for several reasons. First, most 
religious doctrines claim to have a superior grounding in truth. This 
definition would even affect the Russian Orthodox Church, which 
regards itself as the exclusive claimant to Russian spirituality.162 
Second, regulation of how a religious organization perceives 
doctrinal matters risks an impermissible overreach by state authorities 
into essentially internal matters. One Moscow lawyer notes the 
potential implication of this provision: “Any religious organization 
considers its doctrine to be the true one, and a state official might 
find incitement to religious discord in that.”163 Fearing these 
possibilities, social and religious groups, as well as individuals, might 
withdraw from the public discourse as a result of a chilling effect on 
free speech and the open discussion of religious ideas necessary for a 
pluralistic, democratic society. 
Moreover, such a prohibition, if taken literally, will result in a 
declaration that all proselytizing religious groups are extremist 
organizations subject to arbitrary suspension, liquidation, or a 
complete ban—a result that would be even more oppressive than the 
Religion Law’s fifteen-year provision. For many religious 
organizations, proselytism is an integral part of religious belief and 
practice and this right has repeatedly been upheld by the European 
Court of Human Rights.164 This hypothetical possibility 
demonstrates the potential for arbitrary application. Although 
seemingly tenuous in the abstract, this element of “extremism” may 
serve as grounds for denial of registration or liquidation of religious 
organizations if a local administration is intent on eliminating a 
particular social, religious, or political organization. 
 
 161. Extremism Law, supra note 4, art. 1. 
 162. Fagan & Titova, supra note 160 (quoting Mikhail Kuznetsov, professor at the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, who raised the question: “We Orthodox are against ecumenism: 
but if we believe Orthodoxy is the only right faith, or if Muslims believe their faith to be the 
best, why prosecute them?”). 
 163. Id. (quoting Moscow Professor and Lawyer, Lev Simkin). 
 164. See Larissis v. Greece, App. Nos. 23372/94, 26377/94, 26378/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1998), available at http://www.echr.coe.int; Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993), available at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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C.  Potential for Arbitrary Discretion and Perverse Application 
One obstacle to the enforcement of existing laws has been the 
absence of a sufficient definition of extremism. The Extremism Law, 
while fairly clear in its foreseeable application to truly reprehensible 
behaviors, fails to provide the needed guidance in the less obvious 
cases. Instead, criticisms abound that the law’s definition of extremist 
activity is excessively broad.165 A vague, overly-broad definition fails 
as a prior restraint to provide notice by which parties can shape their 
behavior and frame their speech and risks ultimately leading to 
dubious application, if not blatant abuse. 
Several critical hypothetical scenarios have explored the potential 
of the definition of extremism provided in the Extremism Law. One 
commentator has argued that the law seeks “to create a uniform 
person tolerant of every belief . . . . This is secularized totalitarianism, 
we will have to be tolerant of all scoundrels.”166 Although admittedly 
far-fetched, another commentator notes the contextual nature of the 
definition of extremism: “[I]f someone says that ‘capitalists are 
greedy’ or even that ‘skinheads are no good,’ one cannot but 
perceive it as ‘extremist propaganda.’”167 The same commentator 
suggests a more realistic application: “To forbid ‘the propaganda of 
exclusiveness’ of religious communities is to impose an extremely 
harsh constraint on the preaching of all the main religions.”168 
Another possibility for potential abuse that follows from these 
examples is that the state will befriend certain groups based on their 
ability to assist in marginalizing others.  
Two actual scenarios indicate that the present legislation has 
already been invoked in ways that raise the question of who the 
Extremism Law is designed to protect. The first scenario involves a 
nongovernmental organization, the Novorossiisk Committee for 
Human Rights, which felt the early brunt of the law when the 
regional deputy governor told the organization’s leader: “[W]e will 
 
 165. Alexander Verkhovsky, Taking Anti-Extremism to Extremes, JOHNSON’S RUSSIA 
LIST, at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6401-1.cfm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003). 
 166. Fagan & Titova, supra note 160 (quoting Mikhail Kuznetzov, Professor, Russian 
Academy of State Sciences). 
 167. Verkhovsky, supra note 165. 
 168. Id. 
GRO-FIN 5/31/2003  1:13 PM 
717] Desktop Publishing Example 
 755 
test the new law on extremism on your organization.”169 The 
Novorossiisk Committee represents a group of Meshketian Turks in 
the Krasnodar Krai who have endured intense discrimination at the 
hands of government authorities.170 The Meshketian Turks are a 
“Turkish-speaking Muslim ethnic group deported in 1944 from 
Southern Georgia to Central Asia,” and “about 290,000 
Meshketians live within the borders of the former U.S.S.R.”171 
Krasnodar authorities have discriminately refused to grant the Turks 
a registered place of residence, effectively depriving them of 
recognition as Russian citizens, access to higher education, and social 
services.172 
The deputy governor’s statement accusing the Novorossiisk 
Committee for Human Rights of extremist activity came after the 
committee was accused on local television of “helping extremists 
with foreign money” and “grossly interfering with the affairs of the 
krai.”173 With a backdrop of state-imposed media restrictions, the 
potential for biased spread of news coverage may tend to result in 
politicized media campaigns against undesirable groups the state 
wishes to eliminate, as this situation seems to demonstrate. The 
Meshketian Turks’ situation also demonstrates that it is not obvious 
which group the Extremism Law will protect and whom it will 
indict: the Meshketians, the human rights nongovernmental 
organization advocating social justice for the Meshketians (or 
undermining regional security, depending on how the facts are 
spun), or the government. The Extremism Law provides grounds for 
holding any of the three groups liable, but it is apparently not 
enough—in Krasnodar—that regional administration policy openly 
 
 169. Aleksandr Verkhovskii, Who is Really Threatened by Russia’s Law on Extremism?, 3  
RFE/RL (UN)CIVIL SOCIETIES, July 24, 2002, at http://www.rferl.org/ucs/2002/07/30-
240702.html. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Memorial Human Rights Center, Moscow, Compliance of the Russian Federation 
with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (2000), at 
http://www.memo.ru/hr/discrim/ethnic/disce00.htm [hereinafter Compliance of the 
Russian Federation]; see also CERD, supra note 104, art. 4(c) (“State parties . . . [s]hall not 
permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial 
discrimination.”). 
 172. Compliance of the Russian Federation, supra note 171. 
 173. Verkhovskii, supra note 169. 
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discriminates against refugee groups on the grounds of racial and 
national hostility.174 
What is an admittedly complicated situation demonstrates a 
rather simple point: despite the publicized motivations for anti-
extremism legislation portraying victims of racially-motivated 
violence and discrimination as the ultimate benefactors of the law, 
the law may actually be applied by the state in ways that exacerbate, 
rather than heal, ethnic tensions and divisions. Depending on 
regional politics and the nature of regional-federal relations, the 
regional administration could face either liability for its own 
extremist policies or applause for preventing and uprooting extremist 
developments in the population. 
The second scenario, involving Russia’s Muslim community, 
demonstrates how the law’s vague definition of extremism may result 
in dubious application. Racist and nationalist groups that persecute 
Muslims may clearly be found guilty of impermissible racist or 
nationalistic speech and/or incitement of racial violence, if not 
subject to outright criminal liability under the Extremism Law and 
the Criminal Code. However, Islamic groups may also themselves be 
targeted by state authorities as potential extremists. The Federal 
Security Service is apparently cracking down on Islamic groups and 
has recently compiled a blacklist of Islamic organizations which the 
Supreme Court is presently reviewing for terrorist connections.175 
An interesting variation of this development is the preparation of 
a similar blacklist by Muslim groups which includes “politicians, 
officials, and journalists who ‘have a bad attitude toward Islam.’”176 
One official in the Karelia region found himself on the list for 
opposing the construction of a mosque: “He believes that drawing 
up such lists and publishing them in the press incites religious 
enmity, which is punishable under the Criminal Code.”177  
How the law affects Muslims may depend on politics within the 
Muslim community. Ideological divides between Russia’s Muslim 
 
 174. Id. (noting that “regional authorities create most of the problems, relating to racial 
discrimination”). 
 175. See Several Islamic Organizations May Soon be Outlawed in Russia, INTERFAX, Feb. 
12, 2003, at http://www.interfax.ru/show_one_news.html?lang=EN&group_id=28&id_news 
=5619714&tz=0&tz_format=MSK&req=several%20islamic. 
 176. Russia’s Muslims Compile Blacklists of “Enemies of Islam,” 3 BIGOTRY MONITOR, 
Feb. 28, 2003, at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/022803Russia.shtml.  
 177. Id.  
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communities have resulted in perpetual accusations that all other 
Islamic minorities are “Wahhabi extremists.”178 Although Islam does 
not have a hierarchical organization, the Russian state has informal 
relations with two “official” Muslim leaders who serve as the spiritual 
leaders of Russia’s European and Asian Muslims.179  
As this article goes to press, the dust is settling from a recent 
threat of prosecution against one of Russia’s Muslim leaders. As a 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq became imminent, Supreme Mufti Talgat 
Tadzhuddin, leader of the Russian Spiritual Board of Muslims, called 
for a holy war against the United States and advocated “set[ting] up 
a fund from donations and us[ing] the money to buy weapons to 
fight America and food for the people of Iraq.”180  
In response, the Russian Prosecutor General’s office threatened 
the organization with prosecution for “inciting ethnic and religious 
discord” if he repeated the call to arms.181 Tadzhuddin’s Spiritual 
Board of Muslims responded to this warning by recanting its 
statement. Instead of promoting a jihad, the Board voiced support 
for President Putin’s policy “calling for settlement of the Iraq crisis 
through peaceful means” and advocated for a less extreme course of 
action, stating: “We are praying to God to make the anti-Iraq 
coalition’s leaders and soldiers repent.”182  
 This recent incident demonstrates the effectiveness of the 
Extremism Law in re-channeling protest in appropriate directions; in 
this case, legitimate expression of indignation and calls to religious 
believers to pray for a peaceful outcome replaced calls to citizens to 
take up arms against the U.S. It also demonstrates the potential for 
various factions of Russian Islam to marginalize competing factions. 
 
 178. Mikhail Zherebyatev, Religious Freedom and the War On Extremism, 1 RUSSIA & 
EURASIA REV., Aug. 13, 2002, http://russia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/rer_001_006_002.htm. 
“Wahhabi” refers to one branch of Sunni Islam “that has become a pejorative term in Russia 
because of persistent allegations that ‘Wahhabi extremism’ was to blame for terrorist attacks 
linked to the war in Chechnya.” RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 151. 
 179. The most prominent Muslim communities in Russia are the Spiritual Directorate of 
Muslims in European Russia and Siberia, headquartered in Ufa and led by Mufti Talgat 
Tadzhuddin, and the Russian Council of Muftis, based in Moscow and led by Chief Mufti 
Ravil Gaynutdin. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 151.  
 180. Russian Muslim Body Calls for Jihad on USA, BBC MONITORING, April 3, 2003, 
2003 WL 17800003. 
 181. Russian Mufti Threatened with Prosecution Over Call for Jihad Against U.S., CAN. 
PRESS, April 4, 2003, 2003 WL 18251999. 
 182. Russia’s Muslims Issue New Statement on Iraq, BBC MONITORING, April 7, 2003, 
LEXIS, News & Business. 
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In response to Tadzhuddin’s statement, the Russian Council of 
Muftis, under the direction of Ravil Gaynutdin, denounced the 
leadership of Tadzhuddin and refused to endorse the jihad.183 By 
denouncing Tadzhuddin and taking a moderate approach on the 
pending invasion of Iraq, Gaynutdin effectively aligned himself and 
the Council of Muftis with official Kremlin policies. 
The Extremism Law may be used by the state to force a 
consolidation of the two hierarchies into one central Islamic 
organization, with the aim of creating “a single hierarchical Muslim 
organization, like the ‘Muslim Patriarchate’ that existed in Tsarist 
and Soviet Russia”—a policy that would “greatly facilitate state 
control at the expense of religious freedom.”184 The prospect of 
official endorsement of a moderate form of Islam by the state 
explains the enthusiasm of some Muslim leaders for the Extremism 
Law.185 However, Muslim minority communities will likely resist 
such attempts based on beliefs of doctrinal purity. The European 
Court of Human Rights has addressed this issue in three pertinent 
cases holding that alleviating social tension among competing 
factions within a religious community does not justify encroachments 
on the religious autonomy of a religious community.186 Critics, 
however, suggest this is “the likeliest outcome of Russia’s war on 
extremism.”187 
Attempts to control Islamic fundamentalism by treating all 
Muslims alike—especially like “Islamic Extremists”—are likely to 
 
 183. Russian Muslim Organizations Clash Over Jihad, BBC MONITORING, April 23, 
2003, 2003 WL 19628034. 
 184. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 151. 
 185. See Fagan & Titova, supra note 160 (summarizing statement by Damir Khazrat 
Gizatulin, assistant chairman of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in European Russia that 
“the law could only help law-abiding citizens, while it was ‘simply essential’ for dealing with 
law-breaking ones”); Russia’s Top Muslim Cleric “Alarmed” by Spread of Islamic Extremism, 
BBC MONITORING, Dec. 10, 2002, 2002 WL 104148878. (quoting Mufti Tadzhuddin, 
accusing Islamic minority groups of “Wahhabism”). 
 186. See Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), http://www.echr. 
coe.int (holding that legislation providing state control over the selection of Muftis violates 
freedom of conscience guaranteed by ECHR, art. 9); Hasan & Chuash v. Bulgaria, App. No. 
30985/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), http://www.echr.coe.int (holding that interference with 
the internal organization of a Muslim community violates ECHR, art. 9); see also Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), 
http://www.echr.coe.int (holding that refusal to register a schismatic group because of 
possible ensuing tensions with the Metropolitan Church of Moldova does not justify violation 
of ECHR, art. 9). 
 187. Zherebyatev, supra note 178. 
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further engender discord among Russia’s various Islamic 
communities.188 The prospect of forced reconciliation of Russia’s two 
largest Muslim communities by “[e]xerting pressure on any 
particular group of believers can lead to negative results: forcing 
them to go underground really means nudging them towards 
terrorism.”189  However, as Tadzhuddin’s recent voluntary recant of 
the call for jihad against the United States demonstrates, the law may 
effectively achieve the opposite, positive effect of deterrence. 
As government officials attempt to prevent and referee potential 
conflicts, they too may face penalties for taking action against the 
wrong group. While it has been noted that the potential liability for 
inaction on the part of responsible state officials increases officials’ 
incentive to act, the difficulty of determining which organization to 
target creates incentives to implement the law in arbitrary, politically 
motivated ways. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Extremism Law is part of President Vladimir Putin’s plan to 
restore Russia to a state of law and order as he pledged in 2000: to 
rein in power from the regional elites and oligarchs and establish a 
“dictatorship of the law” to strengthen the Russian state.190 Putin’s 
tough stance on extremism reflects a commitment to counter 
escalating tensions that threaten the safety and security of the 
Russian Federation and its citizens.  
While the Extremism Law may result in more effective law 
enforcement, increased monitoring of the registration of 
organizations, and prevention of truly dangerous tendencies, the law 
also vests considerable power and discretion in local administrators 
who have demonstrated a tendency to act capriciously in relation to 
social and religious groups and who may use the law to marginalize 
political opponents. A broad definition of extremism coupled with 
incentives for authorities to overcompensate in preventing extremist 
tendencies will likely result in greater difficulties for legitimate, law-
 
 188. See Rotar’, supra note 10, at 129; see also R. Christopher Preston, Islam in Russia 
Under the Federal Law On Freedom of Conscience and On Religious Associations: Official 
Tolerance in an Intolerant Society, 2001 BYU L. REV. 773, 804. 
 189. Rotar’, supra note 10, at 135 (citation omitted). 
 190. Gregory Feifer, Putin’s Mask of Reform, MOSCOW TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, LEXIS, 
News & Business. 
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abiding foreign social and religious organizations, a result that 
appears to be another underlying purpose of the Extremism Law.191 
J. Brian Gross* 
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